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The Tally of Democratic Rule
After ten bitter and formidable years, the Yugoslav electorate finally concluded that the socialist regime was a true
epochal catastrophe, one of the major disasters in recent Serbian history. It was a regime that exploited what was most
vulnerable and most susceptible to abuse in the national being. Scattered throughout all the republics of the former
Yugoslavia, without an institutional structure to guarantee them basic security after the disintegration of the joint state,
and burdened by the historical memory of mistrust and conflict between certain nations, members of the Serbian nation
became prey for all sorts of demagogic manipulation. These are the kind of ideological and political tricks that first pro-
duce conflicts and then offer a platform for patriotic salvation from enemies that are literally fabricated through such
manipulation. A rich nationalist curtain perfumed with patriotic incense very soon fell over the political space, imme-
diately proving to be the most effective way to collect votes. In a flash, the nationalist deceit turned into a bountiful
source of political capital, and anyone who failed to spice his political stew with nationalism had nothing to ask for on
the electoral scene. The electorate could not have avoided this trap and this is the mechanism that gave rise to the most
unfortunate decade in the painful and often unbearable history of this nation, from the two Serbian uprisings to the
present day. We should have finally learned from the bitter experience that, in this ethnically mixed space, the most
certain road to disaster leads through hatred and conflicts with other nations. Here, tolerance and understanding among
different ethnic entities have always been and quite certainly remain so greatly desirable and necessary that it is no
exaggeration to say that true and genuine patriotism here must imply practically the same kind of sincere and deep
affection for the nations with which and alongside which we live as for our own nation.  An illustration this point can
be found in the model of Veljko Petrovi, whose patriotism is impossible to doubt and who wrote the famous story
Bunja, one of the three most beautiful in Serbian literature, speaking about the tragic destiny of a Croat from Baka.
Explosion of Popular Expectations
It seems that the Yugoslav nations have been cured from the malignant nationalist disease, and so finally has the
Serbian nation. Overcoming nationalism among the Serbian nation, to the extent that one can speak of permanent
change, can be characterized without any exaggeration as a landmark achievement. The reason for this lies in the
fact that the Serbian nation can rightly said to have been in the most difficult position since, due to its wide disper-
sion, it was mixed with others and so was the most exposed to the potential of existential risks and manipulation.
The collapse of nationalism in Serbia will perhaps prove to have marked the epochal collapse of nationalism on the
entire Balkan peninsula.
FRY 2000 2000 I 2001 I 2001 I 2001
Basic Economic Indicators 1999 XII 2000 I 2000
GDP growth in real 1994 prices a) É 8.4% É É É
Industrial Production É 10.9% É -7.3% 8.7%
Montenegro É 3.7% É -6.0% -9.7%
Serbia É 11.4% É -7.4% 10.3%
Central Serbia É 12.0% É -3.4% 5.4%
Vojvodina É 10.1% É -15.2% 23.0%
Average Wage - DM É É É É É
Serbia 93 -11.2% 127 -5.9% 69.5%
Unemployment Rate b) ... É 28.8% É É
Montenegro ... É 39.2% É É
Serbia ... É 28.0% É É
Current account, in USD millions -1,298 3.2% É É É
Trade balance, in USD millions -1,989 -10.6% -195 0.5% 28.3%
Export - USD million 1,723 15.0% 123 -12.5% 17.1%
Montenegro 157 31.1% 25 385.5% 37.1%
Serbia 1,411 13.8% 98 -28.1% 13.4%
Import - USD million 3,711 12.6% 318 11.8% 3.1%
Montenegro 313 -1.0% 18 37.8% -25.4%
Serbia 3,035 15.6% 293 8.6% 3.7%
Monetary supply (M1), end of period, in DIN billion 29.6 60.7% 28.6 -3.5% 73.9%
Cash 10.3 39.8% 9.4 -9.3% 52.3%
Deposits 19.3 74.9% 19.3 -0.4% 86.7%
Real money supply, end of period, in DM million 1,043 -26.7% 954 -3.5% 39.2%
Market exchange rate, monthly level 5.84% 37.3% 5.76% -15.3% 42.6%
Retail prices É 75.7% É 3.0% 111.5%
Serbia É 70.0% É 3.2% 110.3%
Cost of living É 85.6% É 3.0% 111.6%
Serbia É 79.6% É 3.2% 111.1%
Industrial prices É 106.5% É É É
Serbia É 102.6% É É É
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 25.45 103.2% 30.00 0.0% 41.0%
a) Estimates based on information from the Federal Statistics Office.
b)  Unemployment rate refers to December.
2 February 2001 Macroeconomic Review
However, with the fall of the old regime, which thrived on the nationalist ideologies and social demagogy closely linked
to it, enormous expectations arose. The level of aspirations presents itself as almost proportional to the depth of the pover-
ty and misery to which the nationalist pestilence pushed the entire nation. The sudden and explosive expectations repre-
sent the greatest threat to the new political order. After long years of deprivation — this was a crisis that lasted two and-a-
half times longer than the Great Economic Crisis of 1929-1933 and which cut all the macroeconomic aggregates by at least
double the corresponding cuts in the Great Economic Crisis — people are impatiently awaiting major and lasting improve-
ments. There are no resources for this in our economy. Over a ten-year period FRY experienced double bankruptcy by
international standards; gross investments ranged at around 12% of social product, while the share of depreciation was about
17% of social product; and debts between companies and their clients reached the terrifying figure of around USD 17.5 bil-
lion, a full 15% greater than GDP.  Social product has fallen below 50% of the 1989 level, and a considerable portion of the
available social wealth has been spent in the meantime. The entire infrastructure was deplorably degraded through inces-
sant exploitation without investments and maintenance. Capacities in the economy were more than halved due to insuffi-
cient investments.  The financial situation in the economy and state is disastrous due to the enormous foreign and internal
debt, while wealth plunged into the zone of deeply negative values.  
It becomes clear that there are no material possibilities for any spectacular improvements and that there will be none,
not only in the near, but in the distant future either. The road out of the abyss into which the entire Yugoslav community
was pushed can only be gradual, and full of patience and sacrifice.  Actually, if there was any possibility for some kind of
improvement, even a forced one for short-term use and in the form of a stimulant, the previous regime would have cer-
tainly made use of it prior to last yearÕs elections. Possibilities for a more significant short-term improvement of the popu-
lationÕs economic position do exist on the condition that considerable international donations are received, but it is clear
that such improvements are guided by someone elseÕs hand and that under no pretense can they be considered perma-
nently sustainable. Therefore, it will take much time to renew and possibly expand the capacities, to rehabilitate the untend-
ed and ruined facilities, to create and fill the deplorable voids of working capital, to have people re-embrace production
discipline, to receive additional training and refresh their forgotten knowledge. Any hopes for major and easily achieved
improvements represent a serious delusion and unforgivable illusion. Such improvements are not possible in our economy
at the elementary, resource level.
What can the factors of such improvements do, if we disregard international donations, which probably cannot repre-
sent a lasting orientation in the strategy of the Yugoslav communityÕs economic turnabout? The only thing possible is a
change of institutions and the legal order defining the rules in the economic, political and every other game. It is first nec-
essary to point out that a change of the rules, with certain exceptions that will be discussed in greater detail later in the
text, cannot produce instantaneous results. Economic and other factors must first observe and learn these rules, master the
new procedures and new patterns of conduct which the rules imply, become assured that the change of the rules are per-
manent, and only then begin, most probably in a gradual and cautious manner, to redirect their resources towards new,
individually and socially more rational needs. And then, time will also be needed for the new alternative to produce fresh,
major effects. One would say that only the patient stand a chance.
Nevertheless, delays do not end with the time needed for changing the manner of conduct and redirecting resources
towards new needs. Even the very process of drawing up new laws is time consuming and implies a large number of com-
plex operations. In order to conceive new solutions many things need to be examined and studied, then the time neces-
sary for drawing up these new solutions is in no way insignificant, which is followed by expert, and subsequently broad-
er public debate, and only then come the complicated and time consuming parliamentary procedures. The road to a prop-
er legal order is a long, quite expensive and largely uncertain one. The laws of a state can be viewed as a specific type of
invisible and impalpable capital whose creation requires resources, which produces large effects if well created and which
are the source of enormous social damage when usurped by an authoritarian regime which mutilates and invalidates them.
All this bears an enormous political hazard. On the one hand, there was a veritable explosion of expectations that is
met with the modest possibility of a gradual and, at least as viewed by the broadest public, slow fulfillment of these expec-
tations. No matter how much effort it invests, the new regime must disappoint broad layers of society. Signs of such a dis-
appointment are already looming on the horizon. Actually, great and obviously unrealistic expectations also produce very
rigorous and equally inappropriate standards for assessing what has been achieved and what is constantly being presented
to the excessively impatient broad public. In short, the public expects the impossible, and then makes strict and unjust
assessments, completely disengaged from reality, about the new regimeÕs alleged poor performances: "they went to enor-
mous pains to get hold of power, promised the sun and the moon, but they are now acting like the old ones — they only
care about their own interests". This text will be concluded with the resolute refuting of such a notion and will prove that
this is not a case "of a new prince, new bondage". The situation has essentially changed: "the new prince" continues to love
himself most of all and to give priority to his own interests, but, in the new situation, the only way to do something good
for oneself is to do something positive for us all.
Short Catalogue of Certain Results from the New Regime
It is first necessary to point out what the factors of the new regime did before they even found themselves in the posi-
tion to rule the state. This implies, hopefully once and for all, their emergence from the nationalist trap. This landmark turn-
about is of such immense value that it is in itself sufficient to ensure, in some future analysis, an impressive and lasting rep-
utation for the factors of the new regime, even more than the positive tally of their overall political moves. For a moderate
analyst, even a slow pace in actions and reactions following the achievement of this great historical task and a series of
feverish attempts and mistakes over a long number of years would be understandable. However, our public is everything
but moderate and patient; it seeks the impossible in the sense of major results that need to be achieved immediately. It is,
therefore, crucial to point to the recklessness of such expectations and inappropriateness of the criteria resulting from them.
Nevertheless, despite all qualifications, the accomplishments of the new regime — especially in view of the fact that, at the
moment when this text was written, it was only around a month since the formation of the Serbian government — are truly
impressive if evaluated on the basis of reasonable criteria. This can be confirmed by a look at the still incomplete list of the
new regimeÕs achievements.
First, the country returned to the world at almost lightning speed. Too long is the list of the international organizations
which we have returned to, and it includes practically all the most important ones. Crucial in this sense was quite certain-
ly the international communityÕs inclination and its readiness to support the new political establishment in every possible
way. In this sense, the contribution of our authorities can in no way be neglected, since they did their part of the job impec-
cably. Then there is also the impressive material and financial support that has exceeded the expectations of all objective
observers. Also established, practically by summary procedure, was the convertibility of the dinar and inflation was cut down
from some 15 percent and more on a monthly basis to between 2 and 3 percent. Furthermore, at the very start and almost
instantaneously cleared were the outsized, socially irrational and destructive foreign trade regulations — abolished was the
deposit for foreign trade companies, the annual tax for these firms, requirements concerning the number of employees,
business space and equipmentÉ Also abolished was a large portion of unnecessary foreign trade permits whose only goal
was to enable the ruthless racketeering of the economy and merciless pouring of its money into the pockets of clerks and
their political patrons. This is one of the rare groups of inter-related measures that will produce instantaneous results and
one of the spheres in which large expectations do not have to meet with disappointment. Even if it had done nothing more
in these 2 or 3 months, the new regime would have merited all compliments. And what is to be said about the equally
impressive non-economic achievements: visible progress toward revealing the crimes which the previous regime persistently
and successfully concealed, the prospects for a political solution to conflict along the boarder with Kosovo, the law on
amnesty for military conscriptsÉ
Despite all this, the insurmountable discrepancy between the exploding expectations and the inevitably smaller
achievements represents a political threat to the new regime. It is no coincidence that the first democratic authorities in tran-
sition countries consistently lose power in the next elections. It remains for us to hope and act so that our country will be
an exception from empirical practice. If the blade of this fatal ruleÕs guillotine were to fall on our regime, this would rep-
resent a colossal injustice. To all this one should, nevertheless, add a discrete memento: if, on a long-term basis, there per-
formance slides onto the well-known path of erosion, there will be many justified reasons for criticizing the new regime
despite its, objectively speaking, more than pleasing initial results.
High expectations
are the greatest
threat to the new
political order
Rhetoric of easy
improvements is an
unforgivable 
illusion
É but there are no
signs of public 
satisfaction with
significant 
achievements 
to date
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The State of Railway Infrastructure in Serbia
The state of any structure a number of years after its construction depends primarily on its initial func-
tionality (the time of its delivery to the user), which implies the quality of construction, the material used
in construction, the professional and responsible assembly of the design and the realization, as well as the
timely, adequate, optimal and responsible maintenance of the structure in the course of its functioning.
There is no need to go a long way to find examples of well constructed and beautiful facilities which, due
to the lack of maintenance, have become eyesores and an encumbrance to the environments they are
located in. They can be found everywhere around us.
A railway infrastructure implies all the facilities necessary for railway transport to function: railway lines
and facilities on the lines, electric power installations and stable electric traction installations with accom-
panying facilities, signaling-safety devices with accompanying facilities, telecommunications and computer
installations with facilities, the land within the railway protective belt, railway station buildings, depots and
other facilities at railway stations in the function of railway trans-
port.
The value of the rail infrastructure and its share in the rail-
wayÕs total assets are given in the following table:
The state of the entire infrastructure directly effects all the ele-
ments of railway transport: its security, precision, effectiveness,
comfort and, of course, the financial results of its operations. A
poor or non-existent development strategy, an irresponsible and
incompetent management, large funds spent on inappropriate
projects necessary for the daily-political promotion of the ruling
party or individuals in it, and megalomaniac ambitious at a time
when the country was under sanctions and barely making ends
meet all brought the railways to a truly unenviable position. The
railwayÕs physical infrastructure has reached a level of almost total
non-functioning and jeopardizes state security.
Railway Infrastructure at ºTP Beograd 
Already in 1991, the managerial board of JºTP Beograd railway transport company of Belgrade adopt-
ed the program "New Serbian Railways" defining a strategy for the development of railway transport in
Serbia, based on the construction of new and the modernization of existing capacities of the railway infra-
structure and rolling stock. The same year, the Law on Railways was adopted, defining the importance of
railways for the development of the economy and especially emphasizing the notion of the railway infra-
structure. Everything was relatively well defined, but for completely different circumstances and an envi-
ronment different from the one our country was in at the time. Over the past ten years, the state ear-
marked considerable funds for works on the railway, but these investments were mostly misdirected.
Instead of investing in the current maintenance of existing facilities, which would preserve the infra-
structure and its enormous capital value until a time when the economy could provide for investments in
new facilities, investments were made into the daily-political promotion of the ruling party and individu-
als in it. Facilities such as the Vukov Spomenik station, the continuation of the construction of the Valjevo-
Loznica railway line and earthwork on the body of the future "high-speed railways", the construction, tear-
ing down, and then reconstruction of part of the Prokop stationÉ
What happened to infrastructure in the meantime is best illustrated by data on its present state.
Around 96% of  ºTP Beograd rail lines are written off. We have no real insight into the state of the ties
and rails on the tracks of Yugoslav Railways (Jº) since, during the previous years, the rails and ties were
replaced only at the places where the safety of traffic was seriously endangered. In this sense, rails were
often dismantled at one place and installed at another.
From among the 9,000,000 installed ties of ºTP Beograd, 80% are made of wood, while the rest are
of reinforced concrete. Wooden ties on artery railway lines and main lines can last around 30 years on
average, and over 50 years on other railway lines. The average rot of ties on artery railway lines is around
15%. The result of the lack of current, and especially investment maintenance of tracks is the fact that the
permitted axle load on over 55% of the railway line length is below 22.5 tons. Around 60% of the switch-
es are between 16 and 54 years old, i.e. 5% are over 55 years old.
In ten yearsÕ time, around 145 kilometers of railways tracks were overhauled, which is less than
would be necessary on an annual basis. In view of the state of our railways around 200 kilometers
should be overhauled every year. The cycle of the overhauling of artery railway lines has not been
performed for the past 34 years, while the last overhauling of the Belgrade- Subotica  railway section
was carried out in 1984, on a length of 2.64 kilometers.
The results of such an overhauling "dynamics" are: a catastrophic state of railway lines, the total
destruction of the infrastructure, lower speed and slow rides on an overwhelming part of the net-
work.
It is interesting that even when overhauling was performed, this was done at wrongly chosen
places. On corridor X, i.e. the most important railway route through our country, on a section of the
Belgrade — Mala Krsna — Velika Plana line, due to the overhauling, the railway was closed to traffic
for almost two years, which is an unknown method in the literature on the rational maintenance of
important railway routes. The works were performed in an inadequate manner and with the use of
second-hand rails, and regardless of the fact that the entire operation was carried out under the name
"2:58", which was to mean that, following the overhauling, it would take 2 hours and 58 minutes to
travel from Belgrade to Niä, at present the fastest train arrives in Niä in 4 hours and 1 minute at an aver-
age speed of 63.29 km/h, while reduced speed have been introduced on the overhauled railway sections.
ºTP Beograd JºTP of Montengro
Value of permanent assets in million dinars
1.1. Total 7,430 2,035
1.2. Basic funds 7,224 2,035
1.2.1. Land 68 48
1.2.2. Structures 5,444 1,969
Share of infrastructure
2.1. In the value of fixed assets 74.2 99.2
2.2. In the value of basic assets 70.8 99.2
2.3. In the value of business assets 59.8 99.0
Position
Source: Balance sheets for 1997
Period (year)     Completed overhauling  (km)
1990. - 1995 110.0
1996 10.5
1997 13.5
1998 10.8
1999 0.0
2000 0.0
Total: 144.8
Overhauling of Railway Tracks at ºTP Beograd
Or the example of the Kraljevo — aak — Poìega railway line, which is being overhauled although it
was previously in a relatively good state, with speeds of 100 km/h. The overhauling began in 1997, it is
still under way, and the speed on certain sections of the railway is now 50 km/h. At the same time, trains
cover the Lapovo — Kraljevo line at speeds of 30-60 km/h, even though this is an important railway con-
nection. The Kraljevo — Stala section, i.e. the connection of the entire eastern part of Serbia with
Montenegro, and the connection between the railway lines Belgrade — Niä and Belgrade — Bar, are in such
a state that trains move at the speed of 40 km/h.
The state of the entire railway infrastructure (the tracks, the number of vehicles, the electric and sig-
naling-safety devices), along with the organizational weaknesses, result in the fact that on the Belgrade —
Niä artery route, on part of the section of the railway line from Belgrade to Velika Plana, along a length
of 90 kilometers, the fastest train travels 2 hours, i.e. at an average speed of 45 km/h. The fastest train
covers the Belgrade — Æid — state border distance, which is 122 kilometers long, on the right-hand track,
in 2 hours and 15 minutes, i.e. at an average speed of 54.22 km/h. The 98 kilometer long railway dis-
tance Belgrade — Vräac — state border, is covered by the fastest train in 2 hours and 4 minutes, i.e. at an
average speed of 47.54 km/h, while the fastest train covers the Belgrade — Zajear railway line, 254 kilo-
meters long, in 5 hours and 53 minutes, or at an average speed of 43.17 km/h. In 1970, trains used to
cover the same distance in 4
hours and 30 minutes.
Furthermore, these are the
time-table figures for the fastest
trains, which are practically
never respected. Today one trav-
els by train from Panevo to
Kikinda 4 hours and 30 minutes,
while in 1958 the train ride from
Belgrade lasted 2 hours and 58
minutes. Between 5 and 6 hour
delays of our trains are a fre-
quent occurrence, and even up
to 9 hour delays in the case of
international trains.
Diagram 1 presents figures
for the railway line Belgrade —
Æid — state border (right-hand
track), which show the differ-
ence between the projected
speed (average per section) and
the actual speed and the delay of
train on 100 kilometers of the
railway.
Mechanized Track Maintenance at ºTP Beograd  
The last machines for mechanized track maintenance at ºTP Beograd were obtained in 1985 and are
being exploited today as the newest in the group of these machines. The result of the age of the
machines, a total suspension in the pro-
curement of new capacities, long years of
war, inadequate maintenance, lack of
spare parts, insufficiently trained person-
nel and a total lack of motivation on the
part of the employees for working on
maintenance, is the extremely poor, and
in the case of certain machines even cat-
astrophic state. An analysis of the 1990 —
2000 period and the state of the mecha-
nization for the maintenance of railway
tracks shows the following:
¥ machines engaged in the complex
mechanized railway maintenance:  
- the depreciation of all the capacities
is over 100%, 
- the average depreciation of tamping
machines is 188.7% (between 3 and 5
tamping machines  for switches are
already into their third work span, i.e.
their depreciation is over 200%); 
¥ machines engaged in investment rail-
way maintenance: 
- the average depreciation of the machines is 308.5%; all the machines, except one for the planning
of the ballast, are at the end of their fourth work span, i.e. they are between 28 and 34 years old; 
¥ machines for the maintenance and control of the technical state of the tracks have an average depre-
ciation of 143.14%. 
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Average Speed on the Railway Line: Belgrade — Æid — State Border 
(right-hand track)
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Machine Cleaning of Tracks on the Territory Covered by ºTP Beograd
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The result of such a state of the mech-
anization for track maintenance is, among
other things, the fact that the index of
planned and performed works on the
machine cleaning of tracks and switches
in 1999 compared to 1998 accounted for
between 18.8% and 61.2%. In 1999, the
absolute minimum in the number of reg-
ulated switches was registered: 148 com-
pared to 1,445 in 1990.
Works on the planning of the ballast
have been reduced by 70% compared to
what had been planned. It must be men-
tioned that no works could be per-
formed in the course of 1999, during the
NATO aggression, which led to the
reduction of the scope of works, but this
did not significantly affect the general
downward trend in the period between
1990 and 1999.
Rolling Stock  
The state of the rolling stock is no better than that of stable installations. The entire rolling stock of
the track vehicles of ºTP Beograd, i.e. diesel and electric locomotives, diesel-motor trains, rail cars and
elecric motor trains total to 513 vehicles. At this moment, which is also the average state, there are only
33 track vehicles in working order, i.e. the rate of immobilization is 74%. ºTP Beograd possesses 392 pas-
senger cars, 130 of which are in working order and 262 are not. Out of the total of 14,601 freight cars,
only 5,264 are in working order, i.e. the rate of immobilization is 64%. An average of 90 passenger and
20-30 freight trains are cancelled each day.
Electrical Engineering Installations,Telecommunications, and Signaling-Safety Devices 
Electrical engineering devices are over 30 years old and are on the verge of 100% depreciation. After
30 years of work, the overhead contact line is practically worn out and unless it is replaced en masse,
transport on electrified railway lines could be seriously jeopardized.
The state of the telecommunications systems is also critical. The automatic telephone and telegraph net-
work and the analogous relay systems are between 25 and 40 years old and have become totally outdated,
so that their revitalization is absolutely impossible — the spare parts are no longer produced. The most criti-
cal part of the telecommunications system are the routes of the air TT lines, where the situation is totally
unstable and chaotic on 70% of the
length. Due to this, there are no commu-
nications on a large number of railway
sections, which is today absolutely
impermissible.
The mobile part of the locomotive
ground-train radio link is 60% damaged,
so that this communication is largely
non-functional on artery railways. The
ground-train radio link does not function,
the registrophonic devices are out of use,
while the railway telephones have been
stolen. This kind of a telecommunica-
tions system quite certainly cannot repre-
sent the basis for introducing a modern
information system, which our railways
are also badly in need of.
The signaling-safety devices are also
in such a state that they require general
reconstruction since their faulty state and
lack of devices directly endanger the
safety of railway transport. Due to
unquestionably jeopardized safety, the
unpopular but only remaining possibility is speed reduction, so that our trains run ever slower along the
tracks of ºTP Beograd. Due to the speed reduction an increasingly large number of passenger and freight
cars, which we do not have, is necessary.  So the vicious circle of inefficiency is complete.
From this short review of the state of the railway infrastructure, it is clear that the railways need radical
changes. The entire system must be placed on different foundations, from technical, through organizational
to personnel issues. It is the state that must adopt a clear stand in regard to its general expectations of the
railways as a system, the transport policy tasks placed before it and the general development strategy of var-
ious transport branches in Yugoslavia. It is only with the circumstances defined in such a manner, with the
precise formulation of the tasks and principles for surviving on the market of transport services, that the rail-
ways can set off on the road to recovery, which will quite certainly be long and full of challenges.
Macroeconomic Review February 2001 5
Machine Regulation of Switches on the Territory Covered by ºTP Beograd
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Machine Regulation of Tracks on the Territory Covered by ºTP Beograd
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MACROECONOMIC REVIEW
Prices and Wages
Economic policy in Serbia is facing a cruel dilemma. In our earlier reviews we mentioned the choice
between a high quasi-fiscal deficit and accumulated losses in public companies on the one hand, and the
maintenance of price stability on the other. An additional problem is the limitation imposed by the need
to identify a socially sustainable solution. In the first month, this dilemma was partially resolved to the
benefit of the former option.
Total retail price growth in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) for January was
3.0%.  Growth in retail prices was mostly boosted
by trends in the prices of services (8.6%). The
prices of municipal-housing services registered
the largest rise, up approximately 43.7%. This
partly eliminated the less painful part of price dis-
parities. The announced gradual adjustment to the
cost of electricity, and the potential of new
increases in the prices of fuel and municipal ser-
vices could have far more significant repercus-
sions. Until then, no inflationary pressures are
expected from the industrial sector, or at least not
considerably larger than desired. This is attested
to by the registered increase in the prices of
industrial products in January, up only 1.8%,
while the prices of agricultural products, down
0.6%, had a stabilizing effect.
In January, retail prices in Serbia were up
3.2% month-on-month, and up 110.3% year-on-
year. Since at issue is predominantly the growth of
the prices in vital services, identical rates were registered in the measurement of the cost of living. The
costs of living in the FRY were up 3.0% in January month-on-month. The rise in the costs of housing, up
11.2%, accounted for a large role in the overall increase in the cost of services, up 16.7%. The cost of
basic nutrition was up 1.2%, tobacco and beverages were up 2.0%, and clothes and footwear were up
4.8%. In January, the cost of living in Serbia was up 3.2% month-on-month, and up 111.1% year-on-year.
Net average wages in Serbia in January (3,821 din.) fell by 5.9% month-on-month. Expressed in
German marks, January wages were 127.4 DEM, which represents the same drop relative to the preced-
ing month. The real purchasing power of salaries in January (nominal wages deflated by the cost of liv-
ing index) fell by 8.8% relative to the usual growth in the last month of the year, when the real purchas-
ing power of wages increased by 20.7%. Net average wages in the trade sector (3,739 din. or 124.6 DEM)
fell 3.1%, while in the non-trade sector the fell 13.8% to 4,107 din. or 136.9 DEM. The extremely large
oscillations in earnings heightened tensions and led to the announcement of strikes, especially in the sec-
tors of health care and education. The peak of social unrest is to be expected prior to the adoption of
the republican budget, from which these sectors are financed, for the purpose of strengthening the trade
unionsÕ negotiating position. Compared to the same month last year, the average wage (expressed in
DEM) is up by 69.5%, but without any major effects on the real purchasing power.
Net average pensions in Serbia for January (2,986 din.) registered a 21.6% drop month-on-month,
whether expressed in nominal (2,986 din.) or real (99.5 DEM) terms. In December 2000 relative to
November 2000, pensions recorded a nominal growth of 63.6%. The real purchasing power of pensions
fell by 24.0% in January, while in December 2000 it rose by 60.7%.
Output 
The usual seasonal drop in output was registered in January. Relative to the preceding month, out-
put was down by 7.3%. In Montenegro, output fell by 6.0%, and in Serbia it was down 7.4%. In Central
Serbia, the production fell 3.4%, and in Vojvodina by 15.2%. Output increased in only three sectors — the
production of leather and leather goods, footwear was up by 1.8%, basic metal production by 19.6% and
the production and supply of electricity, gas, steam and warm water rose 19.8%. Importantly, the desea-
sonalized index for January shows 10.4% growth in production relative to December.
Industrial output in the FRY rose by 8.7% in January 2001 year-on-year, with the impact of seasonal
factors being the same. Output in Montenegro fell by 9.7%, while it increased in Serbia by 10.3%.
Expressed in this manner, output in Central Serbia recorded 5.4% growth, while Vojvodina saw 23.0%
growth. Industrial output increased in 18 sectors compared to the same month of the previous year — from
1.9% (the manufacture of metal products, except machines) to 67.5% (the production of garments and
fur).  Ten sectors recorded a drop in output, ranging between 2.2% (the manufacture of tobacco prod-
ucts) and 68.9% (the production of radio, TV and communication equipment). Industrial output in the
FRY in 2000 (according to final figures) was up by 11.1% relative to the preceding year. Montenegro reg-
istered 3.7% growth in industrial output, and Serbia was up 11.7%. Industrial output in the FRY in January
2001 was down 64.7% relative to January 1989. 
From the perspective of accumulated debts, the four most vulnerable sectors are the electric power
industry, oil and gas production, the manufacture of transport means, and ferrous metallurgy. All the com-
panies operating within the Serbian Electric Power Company are on the list of the 100 major loss-making
firms, while the Serbian Oil Company is first. The largest companies in the two other branches are also
high up on the list. They employ around 120,000 people. There are, nevertheless, several crucial differ-
ences among these sectors. The level of capacity utilization and industrial output differs drastically. The
production of transport means is operating at 6% of its 1989 output, while the electric power industry
operates at around 90%. Various causes are also at issue — e.g. price controls and the loss of markets are
major contributors to the low level of capacity utilization. A second part of the problem can be linked to
public municipal companies, which absorb an enormous portion of the losses.  These facts should also
be borne in mind when speaking of the true unemployment rate. 
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Foreign trade
Last yearÕs current account deficit was USD 1.3 billion. In January, Yugoslavia exported goods worth
USD 123 million and imported goods with a value of USD 318 million, producing a trade deficit of USD
195 million. January exports fell by 12.52% month-on-month, while imports were up by 11.76%. The
systematic deregulation of hard currency transactions related to imports and exports abolished a large
part of the stateÕs discretional rights.
Even though the dinar registered
real depreciation over a very long
period of time, in the event of a more
intensive correction of price dispari-
ties and a higher inflation rate, the
already low competitiveness of
goods from Serbia will, nevertheless,
be jeopardized. This does not mean
that the stability of the dinar will be
jeopardized as well. The policy of a
guided fluctuating exchange rate is
credible in the upcoming period,
particularly with a near-term favor-
able political outcome on the inflow
of funds from a number of sources —
direct foreign investments, credits
and donations.
Regarding the structure of foreign
trade by groups of products, the
largest share in the FRYÕs total
exports in January was: aluminum (15.26%), raspberries (4.0%) and refined copper (3.0%). In January,
Serbia exported goods worth USD 98 million, and imported goods with a value of USD 293 million, for
a trade deficit of USD 195 million. Relative to December 2000, exports dropped by 28.11%, while
imports increased by 8.6%, and the deficit grew by 45.5%. Relative to January 2000, exports increased
by 13.4%, imports were up by 3.7%, and the deficit dropped by 0.9%.
Regarding the structure of foreign trade by groups of products, the largest categories of exports
from Serbia in January by value were: raspberries (5.0%) and refined copper (3.8%). The largest cate-
gories of imports to Serbia in January by value were: oil (8.1%) and electricity (7.7%), which was
financed from donations.
Money, Public Revenues and Expenditures 
After several-months of growth in the money supply, M1 dropped in January by 3.5%, so that the
money aggregate found itself at the level of 28.6 billion dinars at the end of the month. In January, the
emission policy still relied exclusively on hard currency transactions, while primary money accounted
for 19.6 billion dinars.
Considerable changes in the M1
money aggregate occurred once
again. Cash was reduced by 9.3%,
while deposit money, down 0.4%,
remained at approximately the
same level. In February, the NBJ
was actively present on the finan-
cial market with treasury bonds.
The NBJÕs presence reflected on
overall trade in this market. In
mid February, the interest rate
was considerably reduced to
5.1%, whereby it accounted for
less than 2% at a monthly level in
real terms.
The illiquidity of economic
subjects is a major problem. Over
26,000 companies in Serbia are
faced with chronic illiquidity, and
they employ 458,000 people. A potential problem is also the already mentioned phased correction to
the disparity of prices, which would bring a new group of companies into a position of inability to meet
obligations.
The gross collection of revenues totaled to 16.1 billion dinars, 3.1 billion of which went into the
federationÕs account, and 13 billion to Serbia.  Budgetary revenues of 10.1 billion were divided by the
same ratio, as were the 6 billion revenues of social insurance organizations. The federal budget
received 3.1 billion dinars, the republican budget 5.5 billion, and the rest went into the budgets of the
municipalities and for ceded and non-allocated funds. According to the federal governmentÕs projec-
tions, the budget is to be around 8.7% of projected social product, i.e. 45.9 billion dinars — around
1.53 billion DEM, which means that around 100 million DEM or 6.5% of the spending has been
achieved to date.
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